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1Abstract
This paper analyzes how learning a borrower’s creditworthiness, from past lending deci-
sion by a rival bank that is publicly observable through private or public credit reporting
systems, aﬀects the performance of subsequent lending competitions. Our analysis of twice-
repeated lending competitions demonstrates that such ex post information sharing causes
ineﬃcient and excessive screening of new borrowers when banks undertake transaction bank-
ing since each bank expects future disadvantages to result from the information revelation.
Relationship banking arises endogenously as a defense against such anticipated disadvantage,
and improves the economic eﬃciency by alleviating the excessive screening.
JEL Classiﬁcations: G21 L14
Keywords: relationship banking, informational externality, interbank competition, common-
value repeated auction
21 Introduction
A credit market plays an important role in the allocation of resources and determining a level of
activity in an economy by generating credit through interbank competition. While making loan
decisions, banks assess the creditworthiness of borrowers, or their ability to repay loans, in order
to maximize proﬁts, considering the high returns on risky loans. In their assessments, banks need
to collect all available information and make the best use of it. Therefore, the economic eﬃciency
of the banking sector depends on how well each bank collects information and incorporate that
information into its lending decisions. If banks are repeatedly competing to extend loans to a
ﬁrm, the available information about that ﬁrm should include information about past lending
decisions made by the rival banks. This information; typically available through public or private
credit reporting systems, reveals these banks’ private evaluations of the creditworthiness of the
company. This learning by rivals, in turn, aﬀects the level of eﬀort made by the incumbent
lender to acquire company-speciﬁc soft information covering, for instance, management ability,
potential proﬁt opportunities for original technology, or skills within the borrowing ﬁrm. In the
existing banking literature, however, the dynamic eﬀects of these learning processes among the
rival banks on the performance of the lending market, including information production and
credit availability, have not yet been fully analyzed. The present study attempts to ﬁll this void
in the literature.
In the received literature, banking activities fall into two categories: relationship banking
and transaction banking. Relationship banking has been deﬁned, for example, by Boot [4],
as ﬁnancial intermediation provided by an institution that “(1) invests in obtaining customer-
speciﬁc information, often proprietary in nature and (2) evaluates the proﬁtability of these
investments through multiple interactions with the same customer over time and/or across
products.” Transaction banking “focuses on a single transaction with a customer.” This paper
follows these deﬁnitions.
First, the present study shows that the rival bank’s learning from the past lending decisions
renders the screening of new borrowers stricter than the socially optimal level (excessive screen-
3ing) when banks undertake transaction banking, since each bank expects future disadvantages
to result from the private information revealed by winning and reporting a loan contract to a
credit reporting system. In fact, it can be shown that a bank expects, at most, zero proﬁt from
future competition when it wins the ﬁrst competition under these conditions. This is because
a rival bank can take advantage of the winning bank’s private information about the borrower.
In addition, the rival becomes more optimistic about the creditworthiness of the borrower by
examining the revealed private information that is most optimistic among the competing banks,
while the incumbent lender becomes more pessimistic because it learns that its rival has private
information, rendering it less optimistic (winner’s curse, Broecker [7], Riordan [30], and Shaﬀer
[32]). Based on these posterior beliefs, the rival oﬀers an interest rate at which the incumbent
lender cannot earn a positive proﬁt in the next lending competition. Thus, the return for the in-
cumbent lender from future lending competitions is always zero even if the ﬁrst lending decision
made by the incumbent lender could have positive impact on the social welfare by enhancing
credit availability in future. This discrepancy between the competitive proﬁt for the incumbent
lender and the social return from the ﬁrst lending decision results in excessive screening by banks
in the ﬁrst lending competition.
Second, the present study shows that relationship banking arises endogenously as a defense
by an incumbent lender against future aggression from a rival bank, as mentioned in the previous
paragraph. In response to aggression by other banks, the incumbent lender attempts to ensure a
positive return in the future by collecting additional soft information that the other banks cannot
obtain. The anticipated positive return from the customer relationship in the future relaxes the
creditworthiness test for new borrowers during the ﬁrst lending decision. Thus, endogenous
relationship banking alleviates the welfare loss caused by excessive screening. Those who cannot
start a business under transaction banking can do so by eliciting relationship banking, although
the interest rate may be higher than that under transaction banking.
In the existing literature, relationship banking is considered as a device to alleviate the en-
trepreneur’s moral hazard, using the threat of loan termination should they fail (Bolton and
Sharfstein [3], Stiglitz and Weiss [35]), and the reward of an interest rate discount should they
4succeed (Boot and Thakor [5]).1 However, relationship banking allows the incumbent lender
to enjoy an information advantage over the rival banks and gives it a chance to exploit partial
monopolistic rents in the future (Sharpe [33]) or to deter entry by rival banks (Dell’Ariccia,
Friedman, and Marquez [10]). This exploitation discourages entrepreneurs from making proper
management eﬀorts (Rajan [29]) and causes an over-lending problem for less creditworthy com-
panies (Sharpe [33]). Thus, the existing literature seems to conclude that the acquisition of
proprietary information, which accompanies relationship banking, is socially undesirable and
should be avoided. In contrast, the present study outlines the possibility that the rent resulting
from such information acquisition drives banks to undertake relationship banking and improves
welfare by alleviating the excessive screening problem, which is inherent in transaction banking
in a market with a sophisticated credit reporting system. Several studies have formulated re-
lationship banking as a strategic information acquisition in a static framework (Schnitzer [31],
Hauswald and Marquez [20]). For example, Hauswald and Marquez [20] show that banks tend
to overinvest in information acquisition in a static, localized oligopoly framework. The present
study shows another welfare implication of strategic information acquisition in a dynamic frame-
work.2
The key assumption in this paper is the ex post public observability of the private infor-
mation underlying the past lending decision by an incumbent lender. One or more public or
private credit reporting systems are operating in many countries.3 In these systems, lenders
1In this context, von Thadden [37] characterizes an optimal long-term contract with monitoring as a device
to encourage entrepreneurs to take on long-term projects rather than less proﬁtable short-term projects using
the “rescue” promise from a relational bank. As to the empirical examinations, the existing literature shows
mixed results. Berger and Udell [2] found that interest rate costs on credit-line contracts decrease with the length
of the relationship. In contrast, Petersen and Rajan [28] found no signiﬁcant correlation between interest costs
and the length of the relationship, whereas Degryse and Cayseele [9] found a positive correlation between them.
Weinstein and Yafeh [38] found from Japanese data that the relationship had a negative eﬀect on the performance
of borrowing companies. A study by Miwa and Ramseyer [26] also showed that the moral hazard story is not
supported by the data in Japan.
2In another line of research, relationship banking is considered as “product diﬀerentiation” by banks. Boot
and Thakor [6], and Yafeh and Yosha [40] demonstrated the possibility that increased competitive pressure from
rival banks in transaction banking invokes an incentive for each bank to invest in improving its consulting ability
to enhance customer proﬁtability in a certain segment of the market, and this results in relationship banking.
Din¸ c [12] shows that competitive pressure from the rival banks generates an incentive to diﬀerentiate oneself from
the rivals by establishing a reputation for being sure to help borrowers who are temporarily distressed.
3See Jappelli and Pagano [22], and Miller [25] for details.
5supply a credit bureau with data about their customers and the terms of extended loans. The
bureau compiles the information and provides credit reports to the lenders participating in the
reporting system. Thus, credit reporting systems facilitate information sharing among lenders
that is ex post in the sense that credit information is exchanged only after a bank or a supplier
has extended a loan to the borrower. Jappelli and Pagano [22] show that private credit bureaus
tend to provide more detailed information, including the terms of each loan contract and the
borrower’s credit history and ﬁnancial statements, from which banks can directly or indirectly
infer the incumbent lender’s private information about the creditworthiness of the borrower. On
this point, the propositions in this paper are applicable to credit markets where such sophis-
ticated credit bureaus facilitate ex post information sharing. A seminal paper by Jappelli and
Pagano [21] demonstrates the possibility that information sharing enhances credit availability
for informationally opaque ﬁrms, and another paper by Jappelli and Pagano [22] empirically
veriﬁes this proposition with the dataset collected from 40 countries. The present study shows
that the public observability of the private evaluation underlying the past lending decision by
an incumbent lender, indeed, enhances the credit availability in future lending competition;
however, there is still room to improve the economic eﬃciency by solving the excess screening
problem that emerges from the ﬁrst lender’s dynamic consideration.
The model is formulated as twice-repeated ﬁrst-price common-value auctions under multi-
unit demand. Several studies have analyzed equilibrium bids, payoﬀs, and the eﬀects of learning
from the rival bids on equilibrium bidding behavior (Ortega-Reihert [27], Hausch [18, 19], and
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber [13]). However, the welfare impact of this learning when a
reservation value exists has not yet been analyzed by the existing literature. The present study
illustrates the welfare consequences of learning from the past lending decision by a rival under the
assumptions that the winner’s private signal is publicly observable ex post while the loser’s bid is
not, and that the expected proﬁtability of each loan to a ﬁrm is identical not only stochastically
but also “informationally” in the sense that the private signal that each bank acquires prior to
the initial bid is time-invariant without additional information acquisition.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the basic structure of
6the model. Section 3 derives the equilibrium in a twice-repeated competition under transaction
banking and illustrates the excessive screening problem. Section 4 illustrates the equilibrium in a
twice-repeated competition under relationship banking and shows how it alleviates the excessive
screening problem. Conclusions are presented in Section 5. All proofs are given in the appendix.
2 The Model
At Date 1, a ﬁrm that plans to begin a project that costs I applies to two banks for a loan. It is
assumed that the only available ﬁnancial resource for the ﬁrm is a bank lending. The ﬁnancing
cost of each bank is assumed to be zero. If it is a good ﬁrm (G), the revenue from the project
will always be equal to V (> I). If it is a bad ﬁrm (B), the revenue will always be equal to
0. It is assumed that neither the banks nor the ﬁrm knows the exact type of the ﬁrm for the
time being. Each bank competitively oﬀers a gross interest rate R1. The ﬁrm then chooses a
bank oﬀering the lowest rate. It is assumed that the banks compete via a ﬁrst-price sealed-bid
auction.4
The revenue from this project is realized two periods later, at Date 3. The ﬁrm repays the
ﬁrst loan on this date. Before then, at Date 2, the ﬁrm needs to apply for another loan to ﬁnance
the additional cost I to continue the project (Figure 1).5 A ﬁrm that was unable to obtain a
loan at Date 1 reapplies at Date 2. The banks compete once again at Date 2. The revenue from
this continuation is realized at Date 4.
The loan considered is a standard debt contract, which is derived as an optimal contract
under the assumption that realized revenue is an entrepreneur’s private information and is
veriﬁable to a lender only by costly state veriﬁcation (Townsend [36], Gale and Hellwig [16], and
4Firms may convert an interbank competition into an English auction by revealing the oﬀer made by one bank
to its rival as part of the search for the best deal. However, banks cannot accept a statement by a potential
borrower concerning a rival bid, since the ﬁrm always has an incentive to claim falsely low interest rates to a rival
bank in order to make it more aggressive. Therefore, a sealed-bid auction is more appropriate than an open-bid
auction in this context.
5Some readers may feel uncomfortable about this assumption since most small companies take out an additional
loan only after they successfully repay a previous loan in full. If it is assumed that there is a certain probability
that a bad ﬁrm can make a proﬁt by accident, a similar analysis can be undertaken even if it is assumed that a
ﬁrm applies for another loan after successfully repaying the previous loan, except that we need to consider the
additional step of Bayesian learning from a successful repayment. In order to keep notations to a minimum, we
assume the environment to be as stated in the text.
7Williamson [39]). The return for the bank from the loan is min[v;R] ¡ I, where R is the gross
interest rate and v is equal to V if the ﬁrm is good or 0 if it is bad. The payoﬀ for the ﬁrm
is residual after the repayment: max[0;v ¡ R]. The ﬁrm always has an incentive to apply for
a loan since it can earn a proﬁt in any case owing to the limited liability of the standard debt
contract.
Each bank knows that the ratio of good companies in the economy is °, and that the
remainder, 1 ¡ °, is the ratio of bad companies. Upon receiving a loan application at Date 1,
Bank i (i = 1;2) obtains a private signal si 2 [s; ¯ s] about the quality of the ﬁrm at no cost. si
is a random draw from a cumulative distribution function F(sijtype) given that type = G or
B. It is assumed that si is independently and identically distributed, conditional on the type
of ﬁrm. The corresponding probability distribution function is denoted by f(sijtype), which
is assumed positive for any si 2 [s; ¯ s]. A signal si represents private information that Bank
i acquires through a preliminary creditworthiness test. Two standard assumptions about the










< 0; type = G;B (log concavity): (2)
It is well known that the likelihood ratio dominance (1) implies6






(reverse hazard rate dominance): (4)
The ﬁrst order stochastic dominance (3) means that a bank is more likely to obtain a higher
signal if the ﬁrm is G.
After obtaining a signal from the ﬁrst competition, each bank updates its belief about the
type of the borrower in a Bayesian manner. At this stage, Bank i believes that the potential
borrower is G with a probability of
¹(si) =
°f(sijG)
°f(sijG) + (1 ¡ °)f(sijB)
:
6For example, see Appendix B in Krishna [23].
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Firm applies for a loan.









for another loan. First repayment. Second repayment.
Date 4
First revenue. Second revenue.
Figure 1: Flow of the Game
Based on this posterior belief, each bank oﬀers a gross interest rate R1(si) .
At Date 2, it is assumed that a private or public credit reporting system is so sophisticated
that each bank can observe whether the ﬁrm obtained a loan, and if so, it can also observe
the ﬁrst lender’s private signal w. The robustness of the propositions will be checked against
other assumptions regarding the observability of past lending decisions by a rival in Section
3.4. It is assumed that the winner in the ﬁrst competition wins again if two bids tie in the
second competition. It is also assumed that the winning bank in each competition sets an early
repayment charge that is high enough to deter the borrower from reﬁnancing via a rival bank
before the loan reaches maturity. Figure 1 summarizes the ﬂow of the game.
3 Transaction Banking
Under transaction banking, a bank does not collect proprietary information about the borrower
after winning a loan contract at Date 1 (Boot [4]). A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the
twice-repeated competition under transaction banking is derived backward.
3.1 Second Competition
The winner in the ﬁrst competition is termed Bank W, and the loser is termed Bank L. If each
bank bids according to the monotone strategy in the ﬁrst competition, as we will show in the
9next section, there will be two outcomes regarding the information environment in the second
competition. (1) If a bank extended a loan in the equilibrium in the ﬁrst competition, then the
private signal of Bank W, which is denoted by w, is available as additional public information
through a credit reporting system. (2) If neither bank extended a loan in the ﬁrst competition,
the additional information for each bank comprises the fact that each private signal is lower
than the screening threshold st
¤1 in the ﬁrst competition; this will be derived in the next section.
The equilibrium strategies in these two cases are derived below.
(1) Case 1: Bank W extended a loan under the equilibrium in the ﬁrst competition
at the interest rate of R1(w).
The fact that Bank W won in the ﬁrst competition implies that the private signal of Bank L




¹(w)F(wjG) + (1 ¡ ¹(w))F(wjB)
: (5)
In contrast, Bank L exactly knows that the highest realized private signal is w. The posterior
belief of Bank L is
ºl(l;w) =
¹(l)f(wjG)
¹(l)f(wjG) + (1 ¡ ¹(l))f(wjB)
: (6)
l is the private signal that Bank L receives at Date 1.
In the second competition, Bank W adopts a mixed strategy that follows a cumulative dis-
tribution function G(Rw), where Rw is the interest rate oﬀered by Bank W. The corresponding
probability distribution function is denoted by g(Rw). Bank W participates in the competition
with probability q. The bid function of Bank L is denoted by Rl(l), which is proved to be mono-
tone decreasing in l in the proof of Proposition 1. The perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy in
the second competition to be derived is fG(Rw);q;Rl(l)g.
7It is assumed that no bank received any additional private signal at Date 2. This assumption is plausible
since the private evaluation of the borrower does not seem to change in the absence of any additional experience
with the borrower.








I(1 ¡ ºw(w)): (7)
F(R¡1
l (Rw)jG)




the probability of winning when the ﬁrm is bad. The expected return for Bank L is
fq(1 ¡ G(Rl(l))) + 1 ¡ qgf(Rl(l) ¡ I)ºl(l;w) ¡ I(1 ¡ ºl(l;w))g: (8)
If the expected return for Bank W when it wins the second competition is smaller than that
for Bank L, then the expected return for Bank W from the second competition is zero in the
equilibrium according to Theorem 2 in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom, and Weber [14]. Indeed,
it is proved that Bank L evaluates the second loan higher than Bank W in the proof of the next
lemma.
Lemma 1 The expected return for Bank W from the second competition is zero in the equilib-
rium.
The intuitive explanation of this result is as follows. The learning from the previous compe-
tition has asymmetric eﬀects on Bank W and Bank L. It makes Bank W more pessimistic about
the type of the ﬁrm, since the fact of winning implies that the rival bank has more pessimistic
information about the ﬁrm. In contrast, the fact of losing and the observable winner’s private
signal w make Bank L more optimistic, since it implies that the rival has more optimistic infor-
mation about the creditworthiness of the ﬁrm. If Bank W wins again in the second competition,
although it bids more cautiously after learning that the rival bank is more pessimistic from the
outcome in the ﬁrst competition, Bank W realizes that Bank L has very bad information about
the ﬁrm. This makes Bank W even more pessimistic. Consequently, the expected return for
Bank W when it wins again in the second competition is smaller than that for Bank L. Bank L
can always bid down to the level at which Bank W cannot obtain the expected positive return,
while keeping its own expected proﬁt positive since the subjective evaluation by Bank L of the
second loan is better than that by Bank W and, moreover, Bank L knows exactly how Bank W
11evaluates the second loan. Lemma 1 is the key that yields the “excessive screening” in the ﬁrst
competition.
Each bank participates in the second competition if and only if its expected return from
bidding is non-negative. If Bank L receives a very low signal, then it anticipates a high default
probability. Bank L tries to cover the expected default costs by quoting a higher interest rate
when the private signal is low. However, if the signal is too low and the default probability is
expected to be too high, Bank L cannot fully cover the expected default cost since the interest
rate is at best the highest possible revenue for the ﬁrm, V . In this case, the bank refuses to
extend a loan. The screening threshold stl













¤2 is the point where Bank L’s proﬁt (8) is zero even if it oﬀers the highest interest rate V .
It is possible to show that there exists a unique stl
¤2 if the highest possible proﬁt rate from the
project (V ¡I)=I is within a moderate range. The following lemma summarizes this condition.
Lemma 2 (Existence of a Unique stl
¤2) Under Assumption (1), a unique stl
¤2(w) 2 (s; ¯ s],




















Assumption (10) holds in the following analyses. Based on Lemmas 1 and 2, the equilibrium
strategy of each bank can be derived.
Proposition 1 (Second Competition under Transaction Banking) Under Assumptions
(1), (2), and (10), there exists an equilibrium in the second competition under transaction bank-
ing where:
1. Bank W participates in the second competition with probability
























2. Bank L bids when its private signal l is greater than stl
¤2(w), which is implicitly deﬁned by
Equation (9). If l 2 [stw










If l 2 [stl
¤2(w);stw
¤2(w)], Bank L bids V .
(2) Case 2: Neither banks extended a loan in the ﬁrst competition.
If no bank lent in the ﬁrst competition, then each bank knows that the private signal of the
rival bank is less than the screening threshold st
¤1 in the ﬁrst competition; this will be derived
in the next section. This works as a very bad news. In fact, it can be shown that nobody oﬀers
a loan to a ﬁrm, which is unable to obtain a loan in the ﬁrst competition.
Lemma 3 If neither bank extended a loan to the ﬁrm in the ﬁrst competition, no bank will oﬀer
a loan to the ﬁrm in the second competition under Assumptions (1), (2), and (10).
3.2 First Competition
The expected return for each bank at the ﬁrst competition when it receives a private signal
si but pretends to have a signal x, and given that the rival adheres to the monotone bidding
strategy, where the bid function R1 is monotone decreasing in a private signal, is

















(1 ¡ ¹(si)) if x > si; (15)























¡I(F(sijB) ¡ F(xjB))(1 ¡ ¹(si)) if x · si: (16)
The ﬁrst line in each equation is the expected return from the ﬁrst competition. The next
two terms are the expected return from the second competition when Bank i loses the ﬁrst
competition, which is derived in Proposition 1. In the calculation, we need to consider the
expected value of the winner’s private signal w. The last two terms in Equation (16) are the
expected return from the second competition when the rival with a private signal between x
and si wins the ﬁrst competition. In this case, the return to Bank i in the second competition
is decreasing in Rl under the ﬁrst order condition in the second competition (Proposition 1).
Therefore, it oﬀers the minimum bid, Rl(w;w).
Using the revelation principle, we can characterize the symmetric perfect Bayesian equilib-








(Payoﬀ from participating in the ﬁrst competition)
¸ (Payoﬀ from not participating in the ﬁrst competition): (18)
The derivative of Equations (15) and (16) with respect to x is continuous at x = si. The





(R1(si) ¡ Rl(si;si)) = 0: (19)
The individual rationality condition (18) can be simpliﬁed in the statement in the following
lemma.
14Lemma 4 (Individual Rationality Condition) Each bank bids if and only if si ¸ st
¤1, where
st














¤1 2 (s; ¯ s] exists under Assumptions (1) and (10).
At si = st
¤1, Bank i is the only participant if Bank i wins. Therefore, Bank i bids the monopolistic
rate, i.e.,
R1(st
¤1) = V: (21)
A unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium bid function can be derived by solving
the linear diﬀerential equation (19) under the boundary condition (21). The equilibrium is
summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (First Competition for Transaction Banking) Under Assumptions (1), (2),
and (10), there exists a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the ﬁrst competition.
















¤1 is implicitly deﬁned by Equation (20). The bid function is strictly decreasing in signal
si. If a bank draws si < st
¤1, then it does not bid.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium can be veriﬁed by applying Theorem 1 in Lizzeri and Persico
[24], which proves the uniqueness of the monotone strategy equilibrium in a ﬁrst-price auction
with reservation value. Proposition 1, Lemma 3, and Proposition 2 describe the strategy in the
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
3.3 Excessive Screening in Transaction Banking
The ex ante social welfare depends only on the strength of the creditworthiness test, or the level
of the threshold st
¤1 in the ﬁrst competition, which depends on the public information available
15prior to receiving a private signal. The interest R1 ¡ I is simply an income transfer within
an economy.8 Therefore, the ex ante eﬃciency eﬀect of learning from the past winner’s private
signal can be predicted by examining the discrepancy between the competitive screening st
¤1 and
the ex ante second-best screening. If the competitive screening is too strict, or the threshold st
¤1
is higher than the second-best level, it can be concluded that potentially proﬁtable projects are
passed up to an excessive extent. If the screening is too lax, it can be concluded that potentially
unproﬁtable projects are carried out to an excessive extent.
The return for Bank W from participating in the second competition is zero (Lemma 1) even
if the expected social beneﬁt from the second loan is positive. Consequently, each bank under-
estimates the value of winning the ﬁrst competition relative to the positive social impact through
enhancing the willingness of the rival to oﬀer a loan that has a positive expected social value
in the second competition. This “informational externality” results in the excessive screening
in the ﬁrst competition under transaction banking in an economy with a sophisticated credit
reporting system.
Proposition 3 (Excessive Screening) Under Assumptions (1), (2), and (10), the competi-
tive screening threshold in the ﬁrst competition for transaction banking is stricter than that in
the ex ante second-best level.
3.4 Alternative Assumptions about the Public Observability of a Winner’s
Private Signal
In the previous sections, we analyzed the problem under the assumption that the winner’s
private signal is publicly observable while the loser’s one is not. This assumption arises from
the observation that banks can directly or indirectly obtain information about credit terms,
such as amounts, maturity, or interest rates, which reﬂect the past lender’s private information
from a borrower’s credit history and ﬁnancial statements available from public or private credit
reporting systems in most developed countries, while it is almost impossible to know the private
information held by a bank that has never extended a loan to the ﬁrm. The following sections
8It is well known that the level of interest rates aﬀects entrepreneurs’ incentives to make an eﬀort (Rajan [29]),
thus social welfare. We focus here on the welfare eﬀects through the willingness by banks to lend.
16demonstrate, by examining diﬀerences in the outcome under alternative assumptions, that the
observability of the winner’s private signal is crucial for the existence of the excessive screening
problem while the unobservability of a loser’s private signal is not. It is also shown that hiding
the winner’s private information is worse for an economy despite the resulting absence of the
excessive screening problem. This last point is consistent with the theoretical and empirical
ﬁndings of Jappelli and Pagano ([21, 22]).
(1) When private signals of both banks are observable after the ﬁrst bid.
Excessive screening can be obtained under the assumption of a perfect credit register, such
that it can publicly inform the private signals of both banks after the ﬁrst bid. In this case, the
posterior belief of each bank about the probability that the borrower is a good ﬁrm after the
ﬁrst bid is identical and equal to
º =
°f(ljG)f(wjG)
°f(ljG)f(wjG) + (1 ¡ °)f(ljB)f(wjB)
: (23)
The expected return for each bank from bidding the second oﬀer R2 is
º(R2 ¡ I) ¡ (1 ¡ º)I: (24)
The second competition is a simple Bertrand competition since each bank has symmetric infor-
mation and a symmetric payoﬀ function. Therefore, the expected return of each bank is equal








Bank W always wins under the tie-breaking assumption. Each bank bids in the second compe-
tition as long as the private signal l is greater than st










In the ﬁrst competition, the competitive screening threshold st
¤1 is implicitly deﬁned by
Equation (20) in the same way as it is in the case where only the winning bid is observable. The
17ex ante social welfare from two loans to a ﬁrm is equal to
(1 ¡ F2(st











¤2(w)jB))2f(wjB)F(wjB)dwI(1 ¡ °): (27)
The ﬁrst line is the ex ante social return from the ﬁrst loan. The second and third lines are the
ex ante social return from the second loan. Rearranging the ﬁrst order condition with respect
to st
¤1 to maximize the social return gives the same conclusion as in Proposition 3. Thus, the
unobservability of a losing bid is not crucial for the existence of the excessive screening problem.
(2) When private signals of both the banks are not observable after the ﬁrst bid
The excessive screening problem disappears if neither of the banks can obtain the information
about the rival private signal, although they can detect whether any bank has extended a loan in
the ﬁrst competition. In the second bid, Bank W knows from the fact that it wins that its rival
has a private signal that is lower than its own signal. Therefore, it believes that the borrower is
a good ﬁrm with a probability of
ºw(w) =
¹(w)F(wjG)
¹(w)F(wjG) + (1 ¡ ¹(w))F(wjB)
: (28)
Bank L knows that its rival has a private signal that is higher than its own. Therefore, it believes
that the borrower is a good ﬁrm with a probability of
ºl(l) =
¹(l)(1 ¡ F(ljG))
¹(l)(1 ¡ F(ljG)) + (1 ¡ ¹(l))(1 ¡ F(ljB))
: (29)
The key diﬀerence from the previous section is that the posterior belief of Bank L does not
depend on the implied winner’s signal w. The expected return for Bank W when it bids Rw in








I(1 ¡ ºw(w)): (30)








I(1 ¡ ºl(l)): (31)
18The ﬁrst order conditions to maximize these returns with respect to Rw and Rl, respectively,
are identical. The screening threshold in the second competition st
¤2 is also identical for each
bank, and this is determined at the point where the payoﬀ to each bank is equal to zero when













Therefore, the bid functions of Bank W and Bank L are identical in the second bid. In the ﬁrst
competition, the expected return for Bank i with a private signal si is equal to
F(sijG)(R1(si) ¡ I)¹(si) ¡ F(sijB)I(1 ¡ ¹(si))
+F(sijG)(Rw(si) ¡ I)¹(si) ¡ F(sijB)I(1 ¡ ¹(si))
+F(sijG)(Rl(si) ¡ I)¹(si) ¡ F(sijB)I(1 ¡ ¹(si)): (33)
The screening threshold regarding a private signal in the ﬁrst competition st
¤1 is determined at
the point where this expression is equal to zero at R1 = V , but it turns out that it is the same
as the one in the second competition as deﬁned by Equation (32). The ex ante social return








The ﬁrst order condition with respect to s¤1 to maximize this value is identical to Equation (32).
Therefore, the excessive screening problem does not occur in this case.
The key diﬀerence from the original set-up that yields this result is the fact that the screening
threshold in the second competition, which is deﬁned by Equation (32), is independent of the
winner’s private signal w. Thus, the source of the informational externality and the resulting
excessive screening are the ex post public observability of the winner’s private signal after the
ﬁrst competition.
Despite the disappearance of excessive screening in the unobservable winner’s signal case, the
welfare in this case is lower than the observable winner’s signal case. This point can be readily
veriﬁed by calculating the diﬀerence between the welfare in the unobservable case (34) and that
19in the observable case (66), considering the deﬁnition of the screening threshold of Bank L in the
second competition stl
¤2 (Equation (9)). Furthermore, it turns out that the credit availability in
the second competition is lower than the observable winner’s signal case by comparing Equation
(9) and Equation (32) under Assumption (1). Thus, simply hiding the winner’s private signal
is worse than the welfare loss due to the excessive screening. The next proposition summarizes
these results.
Proposition 4 (Beneﬁt of Information Sharing) Under Assumptions (1), (2), and (10),
the ex ante welfare and the credit availability in the second competition are greater when the
private signal of the incumbent lender is observable after the ﬁrst competition than it is otherwise.
In other words, ex post information sharing by credit reporting systems improves welfare by
enhancing credit availability to existing ﬁrms, as shown by Jappelli and Pagano [21]. However,
there is still room to improve the economic eﬃciency with regard to credit availability for new
ﬁrms. The next section shows that relationship banking is a possible endogenous strategy to
achieve it.
4 Relationship Banking as a Remedy for Excessive Screening
Problem
The key element leading to the excessive screening problem in transaction banking is the possi-
bility that the private signal of Bank W is revealed to Bank L through the terms of a past loan
that are publicly observable in a credit reporting system. This information revelation results in
the situation in which Bank W earns, at most, zero proﬁt from the second competition although
the expected social beneﬁt from the second loan is positive. The straightforward remedy for
Bank W to protect against such disadvantage is to collect more precise information that the
outside rival cannot acquire by taking advantage of its status as an incumbent creditor. This
point highlights an incentive for banks to undertake relationship banking for competitive rea-
sons. Bank W attempts to informationally diﬀerentiate itself from its rival as long as the return
from the diﬀerentiation is large enough to cover the additional information acquisition cost. In
20such a case, each bank will be more willing to extend a loan in the ﬁrst competition so as to
ensure a proﬁt in the future by pre-empting a customer relationship. Thus, endogenous rela-
tionship banking alleviates costly excessive screening in transaction banking. We will analyze
relationship banking primarily as a typical business strategy although it is not the only strat-
egy for Bank W to prevent the loss arising from the informational disadvantage. Alternative
strategies for Bank W will be discussed in Section 4.5.
In this section, it is assumed that Bank W can choose whether to monitor a borrower
after extending the ﬁrst loan by paying a ﬁxed cost c to acquire perfect information about
the type of borrower. It is assumed that the information acquired through the monitoring is
accessible exclusively to Bank W. This is true especially for “innovative” ﬁrms, since these
would be unwilling to reveal information about new business strategies or new technologies to
rivals. These ﬁrms reveal such strategically important information only to a limited range of
important ﬁnanciers such as a “primary” bank (Campbell [8]). In order to ensure the reliability
of the information, the bank needs to commit human resources to monitor the ﬁrm. The cost c
represents such personnel expenses.
It is assumed that the choice between relationship banking and transaction banking is pub-
licly observable at Date 2. Under this assumption, the problem becomes tractable by avoiding
the case in which a bank “disguises” relationship banking. The competition for relationship
banking is modeled as a twice-repeated auction under asymmetric information, which is an
extension of the multi-unit demand sequential common-value ﬁrst-price auction presented by
Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Weber [13], in the case in which an uninformed bidder has private
information that is less accurate than that of the informed bidder. An alternative way to ap-
proach this problem is to formulate it as a one-time interbank competition for a long-term,
renegotiation-proof contract including information provision by the borrower. However, this
paper takes the repeated auction approach so as to focus on competitive allocation amongst
possible eﬃcient allocations that renegotiation-proofness requires in the renegotiation stage. A
perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the sequential auction is derived backward.
214.1 Second Competition
The outcome in the second competition when the winning bank opts for transaction banking has
already been shown in the previous section. This section focuses on the case in which Bank W
opts for relationship banking after winning in the ﬁrst competition. The winner’s private signal
w is assumed to be publicly observable through the terms of a past loan that are published
by a credit reporting system, as in the case of transaction banking. Bank L updates its belief
by the winner’s private signal w. Bank L believes that the ﬁrm is good with a probability of
ºl(l;w) (Equation (6)). Based on this belief, it bids Rl(l;w) in the second competition. Bank
W, having collected the perfect information about the type of ﬁrm involved, bids Rw, which is
distributed according to a cumulative distribution function H(Rw), if the ﬁrm is turned out to
be good following the interim monitoring between Date 1 and Date 2. Otherwise, it does not





F(xjG) (Rw ¡ I) if type = G;
0 if type = B:
(35)
The expected return for Bank L at Date 2 is
¼l = f1 ¡ H(Rl(l;w))g(Rl(l;w) ¡ I)ºl(l;w) ¡ I(1 ¡ ºl(l;w)): (36)
The equilibrium in the second competition, based on these payoﬀ functions, is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Second Competition under Relationship Banking) Under Assumptions
(1), (2), and (10), there exists an equilibrium in the second competition under relationship bank-
ing if there exists a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the ﬁrst competition, where the bid function
of each bank is monotone decreasing in its private signal, and if a bank wins by bidding R1(x)
in the ﬁrst competition. In the equilibrium,







22and it bids V with a probability of
F(srl
¤2jG)
F(wjG) . If type = B, Bank W does not bid. The




(V ¡ I): (38)
2. If l 2 [srl





(V ¡ I) + I; (39)
where srl

















(V ¡ I) + I: (41)




(V ¡ I)ºl(l;w) ¡ I(1 ¡ ºl(l;w)): (42)
The expected return to Bank W is positive owing to the additional private information that
is not accessible to the outside rival. This proﬁt yields the incentive to undertake relationship
banking and, consequently, enhances the willingness of banks to lend in the ﬁrst competition.
4.2 Choice between Relationship Banking and Transaction Banking in the
Symmetric Equilibrium
Bank W can decide to collect additional proprietary information at a cost of c after winning
by bidding R1(w) in the ﬁrst competition. If each bank plays the monotone bidding strategy
in the ﬁrst competition, the expected return for Bank W from the second competition under





(V ¡ I) ¡ c; (43)
23where ºw is deﬁned by Equation (5). Bank W chooses relationship banking provided that the
expected return exceeds the expected return from transaction banking, which is equal to 0.
The decision depends on w. Simple algebra shows that the expected return, Equation (43), is























The assumption requires that the free signal that each bank obtains at the beginning of the ﬁrst
competition is not too informative. The lower the winning bid in the ﬁrst competition, the more
aggressive the rival bank will be, and the smaller the expected return to Bank W in the second
competition. Therefore, it is unlikely that Bank W chooses relationship banking when it wins
in the ﬁrst competition with a lower bid. It is assumed that the inequality (44) holds in the
following analysis. The threshold sr regarding an initial private signal, above which Bank W
chooses transaction banking and below which Bank W chooses relationship banking, is uniquely





(V ¡ I) = c: (45)
4.3 First Competition
If a bank obtains a private signal si that is less than or equal to sr, it expects to undertake
relationship banking when it wins in the ﬁrst competition, since the winner’s private signal w is
observable to the rival after the ﬁrst competition. In this case, the three ways for Bank i with a
private signal si to deviate alone from the monotone bidding strategy by bidding R1(x), where
x is not necessarily equal to the true private signal si, are as follows:
1. sr ¸ x > si,
2. x ¸ sr ¸ si,
3. sr ¸ si ¸ x.
24In Cases 1 and 3, the rival bank opts for transaction banking if it wins the ﬁrst competition and
its signal is greater than or equal to sr, but it opts for relationship banking otherwise. In Case
2, the rival bank opts for transaction banking if it wins the ﬁrst competition.
If a bank obtains a private signal si that is greater than sr, it expects to undertake transaction
banking when it wins in the ﬁrst competition. As in the previous case, the three ways for Bank
i with a private signal si to deviate alone from the monotone bidding strategy by bidding R1(x),
where x is not necessarily equal to the true private signal si, are as follows:
1. si ¸ x > sr,
2. si > sr > x,
3. x ¸ si > sr.
In Cases 1 and 3, the rival bank opts for transaction banking if it wins the ﬁrst competition. In
Case 2, the rival bank opts for transaction banking if it wins the ﬁrst competition and its signal
is greater than or equal to sr but it opts for relationship banking otherwise.
Using the revelation principle, the symmetric equilibrium bid in the ﬁrst competition can
be derived from the participation constraint, which requires that the payoﬀ from participating
in the ﬁrst competition is greater than or equal to the payoﬀ from not participating in the ﬁrst




= 0. The existence of a unique
symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the ﬁrst competition, where Bank i bids R1(si) (si is
the true private signal of Bank i), can be veriﬁed by examining the sign of the derivative of the
expected return with respect to x under the incentive compatibility condition of the rival playing
the equilibrium monotone strategy in each case when Bank i expects to undertake transaction
banking and when it expects to undertake relationship banking, as is shown in the proof of
Proposition 6. The equilibrium strategy in the second competition is that given by Proposition
5 at x = w. The unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the ﬁrst competition is summarized in
the following proposition.
25Proposition 6 (First Competition for Possible Relationship Banking) Under Assump-
tions (1), (2), (10), and (44), there exists a unique symmetric perfect Bayesian equilibrium in




1(si) if sr ¸ si ¸ sr
¤1;
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where sr is deﬁned by Equation (45). R1(si) is monotone decreasing in si. Bank i does not bid
if si < sr
¤1. The screening threshold in relationship banking sr



























¤1, then the equilibrium is the same as described in Proposition 2.
The solid line in Figure 2 depicts the equilibrium bidding strategy in the ﬁrst competition
R1(si). The bid function is continuous and monotone decreasing in si. However, it has a kink
at the switching point sr. The broken curve is the bid function in the case where relationship
banking disappears. The screening threshold sr
¤1 under relationship banking is lower than that
under transaction banking st
¤1, i.e., the preliminary screening is lax when relationship banking
is present than when it is absent. The contents of the parentheses of the second term on the
right hand side of Equation (49), which implicitly deﬁne sr
¤1, are the expected return from the
second competition under relationship banking. Provided that this expected return is positive,
relationship banking emerges and makes each bank more willing to extend a loan in the ﬁrst











¯ s sr sr
¤1
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Figure 2: Bid function R1(si)
the opportunity to establish a customer relationship to the extent that it will be proﬁtable in
future lending.
The borrower may prefer transaction banking since relationship banking may lead to higher
interest costs in the future; however, it is impossible to choose transaction banking if the winning
bank is willing to undertake relationship banking since the other bank with a lower private signal
is also willing to undertake relationship banking in case it wins.
4.4 Ex Ante Welfare in Relationship Banking
A welfare analysis shows that relationship banking alleviates ineﬃcient excessive screening in
transaction banking although it does not necessarily achieve the second-best outcome. The ﬁrst
term on the right hand side of Equation (49) is equal to the right hand side of Equation (20),
which determines the competitive screening threshold in transaction banking. The contents
27of the parenthesis of the last term of Equation (49) are the expected return from the second
competition under relationship banking, which is positive as long as sr
¤1 < sr. This means that
the creditworthiness test in the ﬁrst competition for possible relationship banking is more lax
than that for transaction banking to the extent that Bank W expects a positive return in the
future from relationship banking. In fact, it is possible to show that relationship banking is
welfare-improving as long as the winner’s private signal w does not render Bank L extremely
optimistic in the second competition.
Proposition 7 (Screening in the First Bid under Relationship Banking) 1. The com-
petitive screening threshold in relationship banking sr
¤1 is lower than that in transaction
banking st
¤1, i.e., relationship banking alleviates excessive screening in transaction banking.
The screening threshold sr
¤1 achieves the second-best allocation if the exogenous parameters
°, V , and I are set so that the losing bank’s screening threshold in the second competition
is identical to that in the ﬁrst competition.
2. The welfare under possible relationship banking is greater than that under transaction bank-
ing as long as srl
¤2(w) (deﬁned by Equation (40)) is suﬃciently close to sr
¤1 (deﬁned by
Equation (49)).
Figure 3 illustrates social welfare under relationship banking (curve Wr, Expression (77)
in the proof of Proposition 7), transaction banking (curve Wt, Expression (66) in the proof
of Proposition 3), and in the case of unobservable winning bids (curve Wu, Expression (34)
in Section 3.4 (2)). The competitive threshold under transaction banking, and in the case of
unobservable winning bids, is equal to st
¤1. The welfare in the former case is greater although the
second best (the maximal point in curve Wt) is not achieved even in the former case because of
the informational externality, as shown in the previous section. The proof of Proposition 7 shows
that the welfare under relationship banking is greater than that under transaction banking at
st




















Figure 3: Comparison of Social Welfare
under relationship banking sr
¤1 is between B and st
¤1, as shown in Figure 3. In other words,
relationship banking is welfare-improving if the eﬀect of the over-lending by Bank L in the
second competition, resulting from learning from the implied winner’s private signal w, is small
enough.
The competitive screening under relationship banking sr
¤1 does not generically achieve the
second-best allocation. The optimal screening threshold so for possible relationship banking in
the ﬁrst competition, which is derived by rearranging the ﬁrst order condition to maximize the
ex ante social welfare of two loans, Expression (77), with respect to the screening threshold in




























¤1). The ﬁrst term in the parentheses in the second line in Equation
(49) is smaller than that in Equation (50). This is because Bank W cannot capture all the
social return from relationship banking because of the competition with Bank L. This partially
limits the eﬀectiveness of relationship banking in alleviating excessive screening. The ﬁnal
term in Equation (50) arises from the possibility that the winning bid by Bank W renders the
uninformed Bank L more aggressive and increases the probability of erroneously extending a
loan to a bad ﬁrm in the second competition. The competitive screening threshold (49) can
be excessively lax because of this loss. In the existing literature, it has been shown that a
bank causes the over-lending problem in the ﬁrst competiton because of the possibility that
each bank expects too large a return from a lending relationship (Sharpe [33], Dewatripont and
Maskin [11]). Instead, the possible over-lending problem in this model arises from the learning
by an outside bank, Bank L, from the winning bid, reﬂecting the most optimistic opinion in the
market.
Apart from the credit availability problem, interim monitoring is itself ex ante socially de-
sirable if the monitoring cost c is smaller than (1¡°)I, where (1¡°)I is the social return from
relationship banking by avoiding non-performing loans. This means that relationship banking
may improve the stability of credit markets by avoiding “erroneous” loans. If the ﬁrm is in
a class that rarely fails, i.e., (1 ¡ °)I is close to zero, then relationship banking for this class
of ﬁrms is socially ineﬃcient. Transaction banking or direct ﬁnancing from markets is socially
desirable for them. However, for informationally opaque ﬁrms that have not yet established any
good reputation in general, relationship banking is inevitable, since it provides them reasonable
access to funds while economizing the social costs of generating non-performing loans.
4.5 Discussions
(1) Another strategy for an incumbent lender
An alternative strategy for an incumbent lender to avoid the informational disadvantage
in transaction banking due to the information revelation through a winning bid in the ﬁrst
30competition is to sell a loan package that includes the incumbent lender’s right to match a rival
bid in case the rival wins the second competition.
In the corresponding stage after Bank L wins the second competition, Bank W infers that
the expected return from the second loan at the interest rate that is oﬀered by Bank L is non-
negative under the posterior belief of Bank L, which considers not only the private signal of
Bank W but also that of Bank L. Therefore, Bank W can win the loan contract with a non-
negative expected value by bidding the same rate as Bank L under the tie-breaking assumption
that Bank W wins if two bids tie. Therefore, the expected return for Bank L from bidding in
the second competition is equal to zero. Bank W bids the monopolistic rate V in the second
competition since it can expect a non-negative return in the matching stage even in the case
where it loses, and it can get a monopolistic return in the case where it wins at this rate. Bank
W is more willing to extend a loan in the ﬁrst competition since it can expect a positive return
from the second loan. Thus, selling a loan package with the matching right can alleviate the
excessive screening problem in the ﬁrst competition.
This type of loan contract is rarely sold in reality. One of the potential problems of such
a contract is the enforceability on the side of the borrowers. Credit registers usually report
loan contracts that have already been concluded, not those under negotiation. An incumbent
lender cannot obtain credible information about an interest rate oﬀered by Bank L in the
second competition. Therefore, it cannot match Bank L’s bid eﬀectively. The enforceability
problem does not arise in relationship banking as long as an incumbent lender can obtain detailed
information about the quality of borrowers without their help.
(2) Entrepreneurs’ incentives for sequential ﬁnancing and the similarity between
staged ﬁnancing by venture capitalists and relationship banking
Banks are willing to bid and extend a loan in the ﬁrst competition even if the proﬁt from the
ﬁrst investment by a good ﬁrm is 0, i.e., V = I in the ﬁrst period, as long as the bank can expect
a certain positive return from the relationship in the future. In fact, even if V = I in the left
hand side of Equation (49), we can ﬁnd some si ¸ sr
¤1 if the expected return from relationship
31banking (the contents of the large parentheses) is suﬃciently large. Therefore, some banks are
still willing to extend a loan even in this case. In contrast, if V = I for the ﬁrst period in
transaction banking (Equation (20)), there are no si ¸ st
¤1, i.e., no banks are willing to extend
a loan. Relationship banking enables entrepreneurs to ﬁnance businesses that are proﬁtable
in the long run but are not proﬁtable in the short run since banks try to pre-empt access to
proprietary information that eventually pays oﬀ even if the return is negative in the short run.
A new ﬁrm that has a diﬃculty in receiving a loan can improve its access to funds by sequential
ﬁnancing instead of one-shot ﬁnancing to provide an incumbent lender a chance to establish an
informational advantage.
In this context, relationship banking is conceptually equivalent to “staged ﬁnancing” by ven-
ture capitalists (e.g., Gompers [17]). A venture capitalist ﬁnances some of the initial investment
costs for a new ﬁrm, and then decides on continuing after inquiring for more precise information.
If it chooses to continue, the venture capitalist can earn a bigger return from the informational
advantage than rival institutions in the form of a capital gain. This also demonstrates why a
bank that intends to undertake relationship banking tries to help temporarily distressed com-
panies. Din¸ c [12] shows that the incentive to build a reputation as a “lender of last resort” for
temporarily distressed companies urge banks to help such companies. The present study shows
that the return from informational advantage in the future also generates a similar incentive.
(3) Multiple relationships.
A ﬁrm may try to avoid higher interest costs in relationship banking by establishing lending
relationships with multiple banks. However, credit availability decreases since banks cannot
expect a positive return from the relationship with the ﬁrm. Therefore, a ﬁrm whose expected
beneﬁts from improved fund accessibility exceed the expected interest costs because of informa-
tional lock-in will choose to establish a relationship with a single bank. In this regard, Farinha
and Santos [15] tried to empirically extract the incentive for companies to switch to multiple
relationships to avoid the informational lock-in costs although they could not reach a clear
conclusion.
325 Conclusion
This paper presents a model to analyze the welfare impact of intertemporal information ﬂow
among competing banks through past loan terms that are publicly observable by a credit-
reporting system. The analysis of a dynamic game shows that such information revelation
after winning a loan contract causes the excessive screening problem in transaction banking.
However, this informational disadvantage generates an incentive for the winning bank to collect
additional proprietary information about the borrower that is inaccessible to an outside rival,
resulting in endogenous relationship banking. The expected positive return from a customer
relationship alleviates the excessive screening problem vis-a-vis a new borrower. Despite the
repeated game structure, the present study has not yet seriously looked at the possible collusion
among competing banks in terms of loan pricing and information acquisition. It would be
an interesting and challenging extension of the above analysis to explicitly treat a collusive
arrangement among banks by applying the theory of tacit collusion in repeated auctions (e.g.,
Aoyagi [1], Skrzypacz and Hopenhayn [34]). The theoretical and empirical analysis of this
problem remains a future research subject.
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Proof of Lemma 1 We prove in the following steps. In the ﬁrst step, we verify that the ranges of bids by
Bank W and Bank L are identical. In the second step, we will show that the expected return from winning in
the second competition is greater for Bank L than for Bank W if Bank L plays the equilibrium strategy Rl(l),
which is monotone decreasing in its true private signal l. Based on the result, we show that the expected return
from the second competition for Bank W is zero by applying the Theorem 2 in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al [14].
In the proof, we denote the domain of positive g(Rw) by [Rw; ¯ Rw] and the range of Rl(l) by [Rl; ¯ Rl].
Claim 1 Rl = Rw; ¯ Rl = ¯ Rw = V:
(Proof) Assume Rw > Rl to the contrary to the statement in the lemma, then Bank L who bids Rl 2 [Rl;Rw]
can increase its payoﬀ without changing the probability to win by increasing its bid up to Rw. Rl is not the lower
bound of Rl. This is contradiction. If Rw < Rl then the same reasoning can be applied to Bank W. Therefore,
Rw = Rl in the equilibrium.
Regarding the upper bound, assume ¯ Rw > ¯ Rl to the contrary to the statement in the lemma, then Bank W
can increase its payoﬀ without changing its winning probability by bunching all bids Rw 2 [ ¯ Rl; ¯ Rw] at V (note
that Bank L may not participate with a positive probability). But, then Bank L can also increase its payoﬀ
without decreasing its winning probability by bidding a rate slightly lower than V instead of bidding ¯ Rl. ¯ Rl is not
the upper bound of Rl. Contradiction. If ¯ Rw < ¯ Rl, we can show the contradiction in the same way. Therefore,
¯ Rw = ¯ Rl at the equilibrium.
If a bank bids ¯ Rw = ¯ Rl and wins, it is the only bidder in the market. Therefore, it quotes the monopolistic
rate V .
Claim 2 At an interest rate R = Rl(l), the expected return for Bank L when it wins in the second competition is
greater than that for Bank W if Bank L plays the monotone-decreasing strategy Rl(l) where l is its true private
signal.
(Proof) The expected return for Bank W conditional on that it wins in the second competition by bidding R and
it has signal w is:










. The expected return for Bank L conditional on that it wins in the
second competition by bidding R is:
¼lw = (R ¡ I)ºl(l;w) ¡ I(1 ¡ ºl(l;w)):









Therefore, ¼lw > ¼ww if Bank L plays the equilibrium strategy Rl(l).
From these claims, we can prove that the return for Bank W from the second competition is zero by the
same logic as in Theorem 2 in Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. [14]. Let us assume, to the contrary, that Bank W can
earn positive proﬁt. Since any pure strategy assigned with a positive probability in a mixed strategy equilibrium
must yield an identical return, Bank W earns a positive proﬁt when it bids V , and q must be equal to 1. If this
is the case, Bank L never bids V since it can increase its return by slightly undercutting V instead of bidding V
from Claim 2 (note the assumption that Bank W wins if two bids tie at V ). This is contradiction to Claim 1.
Therefore, the return to Bank W from the second competition is zero. 
36Proof of Lemma 2 The RHS of Equation (9) is monotone decreasing in s
tl
¤2 from Assumption (1). Therefore,
there exists a unique s
tl










































The ﬁrst term comes from the L’Hopital’s rule. If si ! ¯ s, then w ! ¯ s. From the assumption (1),
f(wjB)
f(wjG) is
decreasing in w and the ﬁrst order stochastic dominance (3) requires
f(¯ sjB)
f(¯ sjG) < 1 and
f(sjB)
f(sjG) > 1. Therefore, the



















Proof of Proposition 1 From Lemma 1, the expected return for Bank W is zero, i.e.,
F(R
¡1
l (Rw)jG)(Rw ¡ I)¹(w) ¡ F(R
¡1
l (Rw)jB)I(1 ¡ ¹(w)) = 0: (51)
Bank L chooses its bid by maximizing its expected return. The ﬁrst order condition for the maximization with
respect to Rl is:
¡g(Rl)qf(Rl ¡ I)ºl(l;w)f(wjG) ¡ I(1 ¡ ºl(l;w))f(wjB)g
+(q(1 ¡ G(Rl)) + 1 ¡ q)fºl(l;w)f(wjG)g = 0: (52)










Rearranging the ﬁrst order condition (52) and substituting Equation (53) give:
dfq(1 ¡ G(Rl)) + 1 ¡ qg

























Substituting this equation into the FOC (52) yields:
dfq(1 ¡ G(Rl)) + 1 ¡ qg





Integrating both side from l to w gives:
q(1 ¡ G(Rl(l))) + 1 ¡ q





The bid function of Bank L is decreasing in l. l is almost surely smaller than the private signal w of Bank W.
Therefore, a bid by Bank L is almost surely higher than Rl(w). Therefore, G(Rl(w)) = 0 from Claim 1 in the
proof of Lemma 1. Substituting this into the above expression gives:




37The maximum bid by Bank L is V . Therefore, G(V ) = 1 by Claim 1 in Lemma 1. By setting Rl = V in the
previous expression, we obtain:
















¹(w) . It is readily veriﬁed that a unique s
tw
¤2 exists under
Assumption (10). The expected return for Bank L from bidding V is:
(1 ¡ q)f(V ¡ I)ºl(l;w) ¡ I(1 ¡ ºl(l;w))g:
This return is zero at s
tl
¤2(w), which is deﬁned by Equation (9). s
tl
¤2(w) also exists under Assumption (10). By
Assumption (4), s
tl
¤2 is smaller than s
tw




¤2, then Bank L bids
the monopolistic rate V . The expected return for Bank W when it bids V is zero regardless of such bunching
on the side of Bank L by the assumption that Bank W wins when two bids tie. Substituting Equation (57) into









Proof of Lemma 3 If nobody lent in the ﬁrst competition, each bank knows that the private signal of the
rival is less than s
t
¤1, which is derived in the proof of Lemma 4. Bank i updates its subjective probability that








¤1jG) + (1 ¡ ¹(si))F(st
¤1jB)
:



















¤1jv) is the probability for the bank to win the competition given that rival private signal was less than s
t
¤1.
By the revelation principle, we can focus on the equilibrium where y = si. The incentive compatibility condition
is d¼2=dy = 0 at y = si. It is easy to check that the suﬃcient condition for the existence of an equilibrium is
satisﬁed by verifying that d¼2=dy < 0 if y > si and that d¼2=dy > 0 if y < si under the incentive compatibility









s¤2 is the point where each bank expects zero proﬁt even if it bids the monopolistic interest rate, V . This is
exactly the same as Equation (20) in Proposition 2 in the next section, which is the condition that deﬁnes the
screening threshold in the ﬁrst competition, s
t
¤1. Therefore, nobody bids in the second competition if nobody
lends in the ﬁrst competition. 
Proof of Lemma 4 The expected return from bidding is Equation (15) or Equation (16) at x = si under
the incentive compatibility condition:














(1 ¡ ¹(si)): (61)
The expected return from not bidding in the ﬁrst competition consists of three parts, 1) the rival bids and si
is higher than the rival private signal, 2) the rival bids and si is lower than the private signal of the rival, and 3)
the rival doesn’t bid since its private signal is less than the threshold s
t
















38In this case, the rival wins in the ﬁrst competition although her private signal is less than the private signal of Bank
i. Therefore, we take the expectation about the rival signal over the range in [s
t
¤1;si]. The second component is
equal to the last two terms of Equation (61). The third component is equal to:
Ψ2 = max[F(s
t
¤1jG)(V ¡ I)¹(si) ¡ F(s
t
¤1jB)I(1 ¡ ¹(si));0]
If the rival doesn’t bid since its private signal is less than s
t
¤1 and Bank i doesn’t bid, then the rival infers that
the private signal of Bank i is also less than s
t
¤1. Therefore, the rival doesn’t bid in the second competition from
the argument in Lemma 3. In this case, Bank i wins for sure by bidding V in the second competition. It will do
so if the return from bidding V is non-negative. From these expressions, the individual rationality condition is:
F(sijG)(R1(si) ¡ I)¹(si) ¡ F(sijB)I(1 ¡ ¹(si)) ¸ Ψ1 + Ψ2 (62)
Given these expressions, First, we will derive the s
t
¤1 where the inequality (62) holds with equality. Second,
we will check the inequality strictly holds if si > s
t
¤1.
At si = s
t
¤1, Bank i is the only participants when Bank i wins. Therefore, Bank i will bid the monopolistic












If this is non-negative, the RHS of the inequality is the same as the LHS at si = s
t
¤1. If this is negative, then the
RHS is zero. Therefore, the inequality (62) holds and the bank bids as long as the expression (63) is non-negative.
The threshold s
t
¤1 is determined at the point where the RHS is zero, namely, at the point where the expression
(63) is equal to zero. Rearranging this condition yields Equation (20) in Lemma 4. s
t
¤1 is uniquely determined
since the RHS of Equation (20) is monotone decreasing in s
t
¤1 by Assumption (1). The existence can be veriﬁed
by the same logic as in the proof of Lemma 2 under Assumption (10).
If si > s
t
¤1, the (LHS)-(RHS) of the inequality (62) after substituting Expressions (14) and (22) is:

















f(tjB)dtI(1 ¡ ¹(si)) + (F(s
t



























¹(t) by Assumption (1). The last inequality comes from the fact that
F(sijG)
F(sijB) is increasing in si by
Assumption (1). 
Proof of Proposition 2 The calculation of the diﬀerential equation is straightforward. The monotone
decreasing of R1(si) can also be veriﬁed by a simple algebra. Here, we verify that the problem satisﬁes the
suﬃcient condition for the existence of the equilibrium.
If x > si, substituting the incentive compatibility condition of the rival with a private signal x into the






















If x < si, substituting the incentive compatibility condition of the rival with a private signal x into the














The suﬃcient condition is satisﬁed.
Theorem 1 in Lizzeri and Persico [24], which shows the uniqueness of the monotone strategy equilibrium in
sealed-bid auctions with a reserve price, is readily applicable to the auction in the ﬁrst competition. 




The probability that Bank W doesn’t participate in the second competition is F(s
tw
¤2jG)=F(wjG) from Equation
(11). The probability that Bank L doesn’t participate in the second competition is F(s
tl
¤2jtype)=F(wjtype) from










F(wjG) in the second competition. Therefore, the ex-ante social welfare
of two sequential loans to a ﬁrm is:
°(V ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
2(s
t


































The ﬁrst two terms are the ex-ante social return from the ﬁrst competition conditional on the public information
at Date 0. The last two terms are the ex-ante social return from the second competition. In these terms, we need
to calculate the expected value of w, the private signal of a potential winner in the ﬁrst competition.



































































A is positive if s
t















F(sjG) < 0 by Assumption (1). This implies that the competitive screening in
the ﬁrst competition is severer than the ex-ante second-best level.
The second order condition is veriﬁed by rearranging the derivative of the ex ante welfare (66) with respect































































By Assumption (1), each component in the bracket is increasing in s
t
¤1. Therefore, if s
t
¤1 is greater than the level




¤1 is smaller than that, the welfare is
increasing in s
t
¤1. Thus, the screening level determined by the ﬁrst order condition (67) is the social optimum. 
Proof of Proposition 5 In the ﬁrst step, we verify that the ranges of bids by Bank W and Bank L, which
are denoted by [Rw; ¯ Rw] and [Rl; ¯ Rl], respectively, are almost surely identical. Based on the result, we derive the
equilibrium strategy.
Claim 3 Rl = Rw; supRl = ¯ Rw = V in the 2nd competition for relationship banking.
(Proof) Assume Rw > Rl to the contrary to the statement in the claim, then Bank L that bids Rl 2 [Rl;Rw] can
increase its payoﬀ without changing the probability to win by increasing the bid up to Rw. Rl is not the lower
bound of Rl. This is contradiction. If Rw < Rl then the same reasoning can be applied to Bank W. Therefore,
Rw = Rl in the equilibrium.
Assume that ¯ Rw · ¯ Rl to the contrary to the statement in the claim, then Bank L gets negative return for
sure if it bids Rl 2 [ ¯ Rw; ¯ Rl]. Therefore, it never bids this range of rates, i.e., ¯ Rw > Rl. At ¯ Rw, Bank W is the
only bidder, so it bids the monopolistic rate, ¯ Rw = V .
If supRl < ¯ Rw = V , then Bank W can increase its payoﬀ without decreasing its winning probability by
bunching all bids Rw 2 [supRl;V ] at V . But, then Bank L can also increase its payoﬀ without decreasing its
40winning probability by bidding a rate slightly lower than V instead of bidding Rl < supRl. supRl is not the
upper bound of Rl. Contradiction. Therefore, supRl = ¯ Rw in the equilibrium.
Based on Claim 3, we derive the equilibrium bid in the second competition given that the winner’s private
signal is equal to w, and that Bank W wins at R1(x). The ﬁrst order condition and the participation constraint






(Rl ¡ I)ºl(l;w) ¡ (1 ¡ H(Rl))ºl(l;w) = 0; (69)
(1 ¡ H(Rl))(Rl ¡ I)ºl(l;w) ¡ I(1 ¡ ºl(l;w)) ¸ 0: (70)
Under the ﬁrst order condition (69), the expected return for Bank L is increasing in l. Therefore, the condition
(70) is simpliﬁed into the next statement:




















This is the expected return to Bank W from participating in the second competition since the return from each
pure strategy that is assigned with a positive probability in a mixed strategy must be identical in the equilibrium.
The bid by Bank L that is consistent with this return is:






In case that l ¸ w, the optimal bid of Bank L is equal to Rl(w;w) from the ﬁrst order condition (69). Substitution
this function into the ﬁrst order condition (69) and solving the resulting diﬀerential equation yield:






At Rw = V , 1¡H(V ) =
F(srl
¤2(w)jG)
F(wjG) . Substituting this equation into Equation (71) gives the result in Proposition
5. 
Proof of Proposition 6 First-order and suﬃcient conditions. First, we derive the ﬁrst order con-
dition for the symmetric equilibrium bid of Bank i in the ﬁrst competition. Since w is observable to the rival
after the ﬁrst competition, each bank doesn’t have an incentive to deviate from the choice rule, which is derived
in Section 4.2, when it wins the ﬁrst competition. If si · sr, the derivative of its expected return ¼1(x;si) with
respect to x has three forms according to the three cases, which are listed in Section 4.3. If sr ¸ x > si, then
the rival will undertake transaction banking when it wins and its private signal is greater than sr, or undertake
relationship banking otherwise. Therefore, the derivative is:
d¼1(x;si)
dx




¡cff(xjG)¹(si) + f(xjB)(1 ¡ ¹(si)g ¡
F(srl
¤2(x)jG)
F(xjG) (V ¡ I)f(xjG)¹(si): (72)
If x ¸ sr > si, the rival will undertake transaction banking when it wins. Therefore, the derivative is:
d¼1(x;si)
dx
= f(xjG)(R1(x) ¡ I)¹(si) + F(xjG)
dR1(x)
dx
¹(si) ¡ f(xjB)I(1 ¡ ¹(si))




F(xjG) f(xjB)I(1 ¡ ¹(si)): (73)
If sr ¸ si ¸ x, then the rival will undertake transaction banking when it wins and its private signal is greater
than sr, or undertake relationship banking otherwise. Therefore, the derivative is:
d¼1(x;si)
dx




¡cff(xjG)¹(si) + f(xjB)(1 ¡ ¹(si)g ¡ (Rl(x;x) ¡ I)f(xjG)¹(si): (74)
41If si · sr, clearly the incentive compatibility condition for Bank i is:




¡cff(sijG)¹(si) + f(sijB)(1 ¡ ¹(si)g ¡
F(srl
¤2(si)jG)
F(sijV ) (V ¡ I)¹(si)f(sijG) = 0: (75)
If x · sr, then the rival with a private signal x chooses its bid according to the incentive compatibility
condition under relationship banking (75). If x > sr, then the rival with a private signal x chooses its bid
according to the incentive compatibility condition under transaction banking (19). By substituting these incentive
compatibility condition for the rival with a private signal x into the derivative
d¼1(x;si)
dx , we can show that:
d¼1(x;si)
dx
> 0 if x < si;
d¼1(x;si)
dx
= 0 if x = si;
d¼1(x;si)
dx
< 0 if x > si:
in each case of si · sr and si > sr, respectively. Therefore, the incentive compatibility condition (75) is suﬃcient.
Likewise, we can show that the incentive compatibility condition when Bank i undertakes transaction banking
(19) is suﬃcient.
The screening threshold in the ﬁrst competition under relationship banking, s
r
¤1. The expected
return when si < sr and Bank i participates in the ﬁrst competition is:
¼1(si;si) = F(sijG)(R1(si) ¡ I)¹(si) ¡ F(sijB)(1 ¡ ¹(si))
+F(s
rl












F(wjG) (V ¡ I)f(wjG)¹(si) ¡ If(wjB)(1 ¡ ¹(si))
o
dw (76)
The expected return for Bank i when si < sr and it doesn’t bid is the sum of the next four components. 1)
If the winner’s private signal w is greater than sr, then the expected return is the third line in Equation (76). 2)
If w 2 [sr;si), then the winner chooses relationship banking. The return in this case is the same as the last line
in Equation (76). 3) If w · si < sr, then Bank i wins and gets a positive expected return with probability one








(V ¡ I)f(wjG)dw¹(si) ¡ (F(sijB) ¡ F(s
r
¤1jB))I(1 ¡ ¹(si)):
4) If nobody bids, the rival infers that Bank i also has a private signal lower than the threshold s
r
¤1. The rival
doesn’t bid in the second competition from the same logic as in the analysis in Case 2 in the second competition
of transaction banking. Therefore, Bank i bids the monopolistic rate V in the second competition as long as it
yields a positive expected return. The expected return in this case is:
max[0;F(s
r





¤1 is determined at the point where the return from participating is equal to the return from not participating,
which is deﬁned by Equation (49). Under Assumption (1), the right hand side of Equation (49) is monotone
decreasing in s
r
¤1. Moreover, the right hand side of Equation (49) goes to +1 as si goes to s. Therefore, the
second inequality in Assumption (10) assures the existence of the unique s
r
¤1.
At si = s
r
¤1, Bank i bids V since it is the only participant. We can derive the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
bid function R1(si) = R
r





¤1) = V . R1(si) = R
t
1(si) when si ¸ sr can be derived by solving the diﬀerential equation (19) under




1(sr) at si = sr. The last condition comes from the reasoning that the
bid by Bank i in the ﬁrst competition must be identical when it is indiﬀerent between transaction banking and
relationship banking. 
42Proof of Proposition 7 Since Bank W undertakes relationship banking if w · sr and it undertakes
transaction banking otherwise, the ex ante social welfare under possible relationship banking is:
°(V ¡ I)(1 ¡ F
2(s
t























































The ﬁrst statement in the proposition is derived by comparing Equation (20), Equation (49), and the ﬁrst order
condition with respect to s
r
¤1 to maximize the above expression, Equation (50). The second statement can be
readily veriﬁed by calculating the diﬀerence between the welfare under transaction banking (66), and that under




¤1, taking into account the deﬁnition of s
rl
¤2, Equation (40). 
43